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Canada’s military uses Palantir. Could it walk away?


An illuminated blue network cable plugs into a server rack with a Canadian flag patch, with a U.S. flag motif reflected across the aisle.

By Peter Wolf | Investigations and Industry | North of Polite

Canada’s military uses software from Palantir Technologies, a U.S. company that also works with the Pentagon and U.S. immigration enforcement. National Defence says its Gotham software runs on closed, classified networks in secure Canadian facilities. That answers where the system runs. The question Canada needs answered is whether it could keep that military capability working if Palantir’s support were interrupted or Washington and Ottawa took different positions. CBC’s reporting on Canada’s deployment

What Canada bought

CBC reported on November 7 that records obtained by the Investigative Journalism Foundation trace National Defence’s Gotham contract to 2020. Initially valued at $14 million, it could be worth up to $63 million. That higher figure is a potential contract value. The reporting does not establish that Ottawa paid the full amount. The IJF says the contract was internally flagged as excluded from public disclosure. CBC News · Investigative Journalism Foundation

A federal procurement record also lists a $3.7-million contract awarded in June 2025 to Palantir Technologies Canada Inc. National Defence lists it as competitively sourced under a Shared Services Canada supply arrangement and describes it broadly as information technology and telecommunications consulting. The record does not explain how the contract relates to the Gotham deal. Adding those figures could double-count spending. Federal procurement record

Gotham brings information from different databases together so analysts can search it and see connections that might be hard to spot across separate systems. National Defence declined to specify what information Canada’s deployment processes, citing national security. NATO’s 2025 acquisition of Palantir’s Maven Smart System is a separate purchase. Palantir’s Gotham product description · NATO’s Maven announcement

Why the Washington relationship matters

Palantir’s U.S. government work spans administrations. The company says its relationship with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement began in 2011. Its American defence work includes Maven. Those relationships matter to Ottawa because an ally’s priorities can diverge from Canada’s and because a U.S. supplier operates within a legal and political system Canada does not control. The public record reviewed here offers no evidence that Washington has directed Palantir to interrupt support to Canada. The concern is what Canada could do if support became unavailable for any reason. Palantir’s account of its ICE contract · CBC News

Who can get to the data?

National Defence told CBC that its security assessment found that government data, prompts, outputs and metadata handled under the contracts could not be stored, accessed or processed outside Canada. Palantir says customers own and control their data and that it does not use that data for its own purposes. The remaining questions concern access inside Canada. Who can authorize vendor access for maintenance? What can a technician see? Who independently reviews the logs? National Defence and Palantir responses to CBC

The U.S. CLOUD Act can require covered communications and remote-computing providers, through applicable legal process, to produce records in their possession, custody or control even if the records are stored abroad. Whether that provision could reach anything in Canada’s deployment depends on the provider’s role and what it can actually access or control. We found no evidence that U.S. authorities obtained Canadian military data through Palantir. U.S. statute on disclosure of records

Could this information be used against Canadians?

National Defence says Gotham combines information from military databases. It declined to identify the specific datasets, citing national security. The public record reviewed here does not establish whether the system contains identifiable records about Canadian civilians or whether any data has been disclosed to a foreign private company or subcontractor. National Defence says the information covered by its assessment cannot be accessed, stored or processed outside Canada. That assurance leaves open which contractors, if any, may access information while working inside Canada. National Defence’s response to CBC

A system that links databases could make it easier to profile people if it received identifiable civilian records. Combining records can expose relationships or patterns that would be harder to see in each database alone. We found no evidence that National Defence is using this deployment to monitor the Canadian public. Canada’s Privacy Act limits federal collection, use and disclosure of personal information, with defined exceptions. A software contract does not itself give Defence new authority to collect or use it. Privacy Act, sections 4, 7 and 8 · Palantir’s Gotham product description

Defence can answer several questions without naming intelligence sources. Does Gotham handle personal information about Canadian civilians? For what purpose and under what legal authority? Can any private contractor or subcontractor see, copy or export it? Who can audit those actions and investigate a complaint?

Could Canada keep the system running on its own?

Even if Canada owns every record, changing suppliers could mean rebuilding the connections between databases, the permissions that govern access and the tools military staff use every day. National Defence has given a public account of where Gotham runs. The reporting reviewed here does not establish which updates, repairs or integrations Canadian personnel can carry out independently, or whether Defence has tested a move to another platform. Palantir’s security documentation · CBC reporting on supplier dependence

Parliament can ask how much Canada has paid, who can authorize vendor access and whether Defence has a tested fallback without seeking details about what sits on a classified network. The question for Ottawa is concrete. If Palantir stopped providing support tomorrow, what could Canadian personnel keep running, for how long, and when did Defence last test that?

© 2026 North of Polite. Original reporting, analysis and commentary. All rights reserved. 🍁


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